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RESEARCH & DEBATE
STRATEGIC CULTURE IS NOT A SILVER BULLET
Antulio J. Echevarria II
Frank Hoffman’s review essay “Strategic Culture and Ways of War: Elusive Fiction 
or Essential Concept?,” which appeared in the Spring 2017 issue of the Naval War 
College Review, has mischaracterized my argument regarding strategic culture 
and, more generally, has misrepresented my book Reconsidering the American 
Way of War� I therefore would like to clarify both—my position on American 
strategic culture and the purpose of my book—for 
this journal’s readers� Frank Hoffman and I have 
agreed on many issues over the years, and I ap-
preciate the time he put into generating a detailed 
review essay; yet we clearly have our differences�
On the question of strategic culture, I certainly 
do believe that culture is important and that we 
should try to understand it—ours and others’� But 
there are huge risks in doing so, and buyers need 
to be aware of them before they buy� Since Jack 
Snyder introduced the concept in 1977, the study 
of strategic culture has grown into an almost-
desperate search for a silver bullet, a cure-all: if 
we could just fix American strategic culture, we 
could cure U�S� strategic thinking� But the concept 
has taken on a life of its own—and not a good 
one� The concept’s proponents have failed to ex-
ercise discipline when defining it, and they have 
employed it too enthusiastically, without a critical 
eye or a healthy dose of skepticism� Buyers need to 
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know there are ample historical examples to prove almost any theory of strategic 
culture—as well as its opposite�
In their enthusiasm to find a cure for U�S� strategic thinking, the concept’s 
proponents merely have paid lip service to the difficulty of defining it, then have 
moved swiftly on to advancing their own theories� Most of these definitions are 
arbitrary, not based on rigorous inductive analysis� This problem is a critical 
one for any social science, because if a concept cannot be defined inductively, 
it cannot be studied scientifically� Unfortunately, the terms culture and strategic 
culture have become all but ubiquitous, encompassing virtually any conceivable 
variable that possibly could influence a key leader’s decision� Worse, the concept 
has become highly politicized� It is now a political catchall for every policy aim or 
military approach one party does not like, particularly when a war is under way, 
and at the same time it serves as a means to advance each party’s own agendas�
Consequently, no generalizable conclusion nor observation can be drawn 
from the many studies of strategic culture that have proliferated over the years� 
In short, the field is in disarray precisely because most scholars are self-defining 
strategic culture, which means there is no conceptual foundation on which to 
build knowledge�
While this state of affairs is an academic’s dream, it is a policy and military 
practitioner’s nightmare� Academics earn their credentials and build their repu-
tations by developing unique or contending interpretations—by challenging the 
status quo� But practitioners need more than unique theories, because they must 
bear the heavy burden of responsibility: they must decide whether to put lives 
and treasure at risk, and they are held accountable when things go wrong� This 
is not to say that academics are irresponsible; the good ones are not� But even 
the good ones never have to order people into harm’s way; that means academics 
can afford to be experimental in their thinking and to advance ideas that are not 
quite ready for prime time� Practitioners, on the other hand, can benefit from 
the intellectual stimulus that such cutting-edge ideas afford� But when it comes 
to choosing courses of action that might have to be sold to Congress and to the 
public, they need concepts that have a reasonably solid foundation, especially 
when the stakes are high� Sadly, that is not the case with strategic culture� My 
argument in Reconsidering the American Way of War is simply that no scholar 
yet has made a truly compelling case for an American strategic culture, and thus 
it remains too nebulous and unreliable for the realities that policy and military 
practitioners typically face�
I am all for self-critical analysis, and I have written on that topic a great deal 
over the years� Critical thinking is the practitioner’s best ally� But to solve a prob-
lem we first must understand what it is� In this case, it is not clear that we do� 
The problem is that the American way of war has had many more successes than 
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failures� The differential in favor of successes is quite significant and it applies to 
all kinds of wars—large, small, and in between� That needs to be explained� But 
existing theories of strategic culture cannot do so� The problems inherent in the 
concept obscure not only what is wrong with U�S� strategic thinking but how to 
fix it�
With regard to the overall purpose of Reconsidering the American Way of 
War, I endeavored to make that clear in the book’s introduction, but perhaps I 
should have been more explicit� In contrast to Russell Weigley’s 1973 classic The 
American Way of War, which focused mainly on our strategic theories and ideas, 
my aim was to look for patterns in the way we actually practiced war� The history 
of ideas has fallen out of vogue for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is 
the gap that always exists between what people say they are doing or going to do 
and what they actually do� I decided to close this gap, at least in part, between 
Weigley’s American Way of War as a history of ideas and the many narrative 
histories we already have that tell us what happened� In a sense, I played Marx to 
Weigley’s Hegel in an effort to identify any consistent patterns in our approach to 
doing, rather than merely thinking about, war�
Accordingly, the book’s chapters are short� It was unnecessary to describe ev-
ery battle or engagement in detail; such descriptions already exist in hundreds, if 
not thousands, of other works� The readers of this journal likely know where to 
find them� Some of our largest and longest wars have been characterized by the 
application of strategic patterns that represented no significant changes; hence, 
there was no need to drag out the discussions of those conflicts� The book in-
cludes details only insofar as they affected the general pattern (or patterns) that 
drove a conflict� Moreover, the chapters are designed for a staff college or war 
college curriculum that likely would include other readings� I regret not includ-
ing maps in the book, as they would have made the patterns more obvious to the 
reader, but the publisher vetoed that idea because it would have driven the cost 
of the book too high� However, the West Point military atlases serve the purpose 
and are available free online�
My analysis of U�S� military practice uncovered six basic patterns of military 
strategy in our wars: annihilation, attrition, exhaustion, decapitation, coercion, 
and deterrence� Interestingly, instead of overwhelming kinetic force, as Hoffman 
and others argue, the strategic pattern that emerges most frequently in our way 
of war is decapitation—the idea of replacing a leader whom we do not like with 
one we do, through kinetic or nonkinetic means or some combination of the two� 
There are various concrete reasons for the recurrence of this pattern, which I dis-
cuss in the book and thus will not repeat here� But, once again, this observation 
points to the gap between what we say we do strategically and what we actually 
do, or attempt to do, in practice�
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To sum up, my argument is not that we do not have a strategic culture, or that 
culture itself is not important; my point is that strategic culture is not the silver 
bullet its proponents want it to be� Whatever American strategic culture is, was, 
or might be, it is too elusive to pin down� Nor can we compare it to its British 
or Russian counterpart to identify what is uniquely American about our way of 
war versus what has been imported from elsewhere, or which aspects really are 
driven by the conditions and requirements of warfare—modern industrial-age 
warfare and its reliance on wholesale attrition, for instance—rather than a general 
culture� To be sure, Americans do have a way of battle, as I have said elsewhere� 
It is also true that the evolution of operational art over the twentieth century has 
hampered the U�S� military’s ability to think strategically� But these conditions 
were not always true� I am working on a book now that will offer one defensible 
explanation for how and why our major failures and successes occurred� I would 
be very pleased to have it reviewed in this journal�
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